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Sovereignty Versus Globalization:
The International Court of Justice's Advisory




In recent history, the interdependence among nations increased.'
Despite the changing world, sovereignty remains a central issue in in-
ternational affairs. 2 As nation-states conduct their affairs, traditionally
their primary concern has been for the independence of their statehood
or sovereignty. 3 Despite such concerns, issues of war and peace drove
nation-states to build alliances. 4 Modern developments, however, em-
phasize global concerns placing globalization at the forefront and na-
tional sovereignty in peril. 5 With increased globalization of the world
community, the efficacy and, consequently, the validity of the individual
nation is greatly weakened unless it acts in concert with other nations.6
Thus a sovereign state must establish a balance between self-
determination and independence on the one hand, and the necessary
1. Miguel De La Madrid H., National Sovereignty and Globalization, 19 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 553, 555 (1997)(discussing the role of increased commercial activity, investments,
financial transactions, tourism, and technological exchanges and their effects on the in-
terconnection of nation-states).
2. John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Glob-
alization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 25 (1996). De La Madrid H., supra
note 1, at 554 (indicating that sovereignty causes great international conflicts).
3. William R. Moomaw, International Environmental Policy and the Softening of
Sovereignty, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 7 (1997)(discussing traditional concerns for
maintaining national sovereignty over one's own territory and defending boundaries from
neighbors).
4. Id. (concluding that "[t]his is not surprising, since the rise of the nation-state was
premised on the concept of territoriality: a particular piece of land was subject to the ju-
risdiction of a sovereign, who ruled and defended it from both physical encroachment by
other states and undue outside influence in the governance of its internal affairs."). The
U.N. Charter in art. 2 recognizes this concern.
5. Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic Development, 32
TEX. INT'L L.J. 209, 246-47 (1997); De La Madrid H., supra note 1.
6. John Dunn, Introduction: Crisis of the Nation State, in CONTEMPORARY CRISIS OF
THE NATION STATE? 3, 6 (John Dunn ed., 1995)
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development and strengthening of the international community on the
other. 7 A law, universally accepted by the community of sovereign
states, will define this balance 8 Key to the development of an interna-
tional rule of law, judicial institutions such as the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) craft customary law into broadly accepted regulations. 9
Increasing globalization and decreasing sovereignty impact the in-
ternational legal debate 10 on the legality of nuclear weapons. Before the
end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons represented a necessary evil for
nation-state security. However with the advent of increased globaliza-
tion, nuclear weapons may not be such a necessary or desired security
device.11 The threat or use of nuclear weapons raises a number of global
threats including: human rights, the environment,
12 and economics. 13
In fact, with the increase in global concerns of nuclear weapons, the
General Assembly request for the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the le-
gality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons represented a perfect op-
portunity for the Court to set the standard on the illegality of nuclear
weapons.
Each global threat involves the tug o' war between globalization
and sovereignty. 14 The sovereignty of the nation-state diminishes when
international threats become equally important as national, state, and
local matters. 15 The International Court of Justice addressed these
7. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 562.
8. Id.
9. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26.
10. The international legal debate on nuclear weapons mutually affects and is af-
fected by the international political debate on nuclear weapons.
11. Since the end of the Cold War, the opportunity for globalization has increased and
polarization has decreased. Globalization has increased the amount of regional institu-
tions for economic, political, juridical, and social integration. De La Madrid H., supra note
1. These regional institutions include the European Union, the North American Free
Trade Agreement, the Forum of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the South
American Common Market. Id. at 555-56. There has been a similar movement on an even
grander international scale. The more universal institutions include: the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Id.
12. J. William Futrell, International Environmental Legal Framework, SB79 ALI-
ABA 1, 5 (1997)(indicating that climate change, depletion of the stratospheric ozone, the
world wide spread of persistent organic pollutants, bio diversity depletion, and ocean deg-
radation are listed among the top environmental concerns). I believe the international
exchanges concerning the necessity and legality of nuclear weapons, in turn, increases
globalization and decreases sovereignty.
13. These are not the only sub-topics.
14. Globalization has been identified in terms of economic globalization, political
globalization, and social globalization. De La Madrid H., supra note 1. I believe that these
areas reflect the sub-topics that I have identified.
15. Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
429, 429 (1997)(defining globalization). "Globalization means many things. It is foremost
an economic process. Economic globalization refers to the world-wide integration of mar-
kets. ... A paramount consequence of market integration has been increased economic
interdependence among nations." Id. at 429-30. "Globalization is also a political event, as
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global threats as part of its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons as requested by the General Assembly. 16 The
implications of the ICJ's decision vary.' 7 However, those issues unan-
swered by the Court are even more compelling than what the Court ar-
ticulated.'
8
This piece explores the relationship of the nuclear debate to the
globalization versus sovereignty debate. Central to this exploration is
the ICJ's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons and its discussion of global concerns. Part II explains the con-
cepts of globalization and sovereignty. Part III discusses nuclear weap-
ons in general. Part IV explores the ICJ's advisory opinion and any
other relevant opinions and agreements. Finally, Part V analyzes the
implications of the ICJ decision, the issues articulated in the decision
and those that are not. Part VI concludes.
II. GLOBALIZATION VERSUS SOVEREIGNTY
A. Sovereignty
In the sixteenth century, a nation-state's concern for it's sover-
eignty grew out of the divine law of kings and the monarchical struggle
in Western Europe to impose the supremacy of the king on the empire.' 9
The Treaty of Westphalia of 164820 marked a turning point in history.
evidenced by the spread of democracy and human rights among nations." Id. at 430. 'The
ideology of globalization can be broadly divided into substantive and procedural compo-
nents. The most important procedural element is the rule of law - - the idea that disputes
will be settled and agreements negotiated through the observance of established princi-
ples rather than the use of force or the intimidation of power. In turn the substantive
principles, what the rule of law seeks to enforce, are those that nations have selected to
settle disputes and negotiate agreements. The rule of law can be a way of resolving con-
flicts effectively, peacefully, and cooperatively." Id.
16. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July
8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809 [hereinafter General Assembly].
17. Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Absten-
tion By the International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399, 430 (1997).
18. Id.
19. Moomaw, supra note 3 (concluding that "[tihis is not surprising, since the rise of
the nation-state was premised on the concept of territoriality: a particular piece of land
was subject to the jurisdiction of a sovereign, who ruled and defended it from both physi-
cal encroachment by other states and undue outside influence in the governance of its in-
ternal affairs."). De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 554. The imposition of the supremacy
of the monarchy is termed the doctrinal justification of absolutism. The struggle to im-
pose supremacy of the monarchy resulted in the establishment of the absolutist state. Id.
20. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty-Years War and provided incentives to
princes of France, Germany, and Sweden to form a loose confederation of independent
states. Matthew D. Peter, The Proposed International Court: A Commentary on the Legal
and Political Debates Regarding Jurisdiction That Threaten the Establishment of an Ef-
fective Court, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 177, 177 n.3 (1997). This treaty initiated
1998
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The supremacy of the state displaced the church and the state asserted
its absolute authority within its territorial boundaries. 2' Furthermore
during the late eighteenth century, some states experienced democratic
revolutions which transposed the political legitimacy of the country
from the king to the people.22 This process gradually occurred in more
and more states.23 Finally, modern constitutionalism made its world
debut in the Charter that established the League of Nations and later
the United Nations Charter.24 Since, the glory of sovereignty of the na-
tion-state continues to inspire the birth of new independent political
units.25 "Developing countries that were formerly colonies are particu-
larly sensitive to the possibility that relinquishing any of their sover-
eignty would subjugate them to a new form of colonialism."
26
The sovereignty debate includes issues such as the meaning of sov-
ereignty, the circumstances that characterize sovereignty depending on
the time and geography, and the changing national and international
political structures. 27 By definition a state is a grouping of individuals
who are entirely subject to their "own sovereign legal authority."28 The
most extreme sovereignty, is strict national sovereignty. "[N]ations are
sovereigns over international law .... international law exists only to
the extent that each nation decides to obey it... [and] a nation may
change its mind at any time ... [and] the rule loses its force against
traditional international law with the principles of territory and state autonomy, empha-
sizing sovereign state actors. Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2607 (1997).
21. Cao, supra note 5.
22. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 554. The democratic revolutions that took place
were sparked primarily by the English constitutional system. The belief that only the
popular will can establish a legitimate and legal state power established the new doctrine
of popular sovereignty. Id. This whole evolution coincided with the development of the
doctrine of the rights of men and the theory of division of powers. Id. The French Revolu-
tion is another example of a revolt that toppled a "seemingly entrenched regime." Bruce
Fein & Ward Warren, Failure is Ever an Orphan, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1998, at A16.
23. See, e.g, id (indicating that the Russian Revolution occurred in 1917).
24. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 554-55 (indicating that juridical equality of na-
tion-states and the principle of non-intervention are logical results of this process).
25. Id. at 555 (indicating that currently the United Nations, which started with only
51 member states, now has 185 members). The doctrine of sovereignty has pushed the de-
colonization process as a result of the two World Wars and the disintegration of the Soviet
Empire. Id. In Asia and Africa from 1955 to 1975, the right to independence and self-
determination for colonial peoples sparked a period of de-colonization. Gerry J. Simpson,
The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Postcolonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 255, 263 (1996). See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International
Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1998) (discussing ethnic con-
flict and decolonization in several states).
26. Moomaw, supra note 3, at 13.
27. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 554.
28. Dunn, supra note 6, at 3. "A true nation state, therefore, would consist only of




that nation."29 In this case, international law essentially does not ex-
ist.30 It has been argued that, in this form, the principles of sovereignty
serve as justifications for violations of international law and extreme
brutality. 31 Sovereignty allows a country to patrol its borders and to re-
quire all foreigners desiring to enter the state to stop at the border and
submit to an inspection. 32 When travel by sea on ships was the main
mode of transport, nations were better equipped to control flow across
their borders.33 However, with the advent of air travel, violations of
sovereignty in the air became a new dilemma. 34 The establishment of
laws that regulate commonly scheduled aircraft and seacraft so that
stops and inspections were not required for each new sovereign airspace
entered solved this dilemma.
35
B. Globalization
Globalization is not a recent phenomenon. 36 The nation-state's in-
dependence to control events within in its borders is challenged by
transnational corporations, economic globalization and trade, interna-
tional crime and the rise of global communications and technology. 37
The validity of the nation-state weakens as the gap grows between the
capabilities of the individual state and the demands placed on the
state. 38 The great appeal of the idea of a nation-state is its "presumed
efficacy." 39 Indeed, the capabilities of most developed states far exceed
their capabilities of years gone by.40 States are better equipped to
communicate, develop communities, and defend themselves.41 The ques-
tion remains whether these capabilities can meet the demand of new
threats to the nation's security.
New security concerns emanate from global threats to human secu-
29. Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea
for Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 59 (1996).
30. Id.
31. HENRY L. BRETTON, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 153 (1986).
32. DAVID W. ZIEGLER, WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 155 (1977).
33. Id. (indicating that border checks would be administered before foreigners disem-
barked from boats).
34. Id.
35. Id. (indicating that these procedures were worked out in Pairs in 1919 and Chi-
cago in 1944).
36. David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophi-
cal Conundrum, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 444 (1996)(indicating that globalization in-
cludes the old liberal belief in economic interdependence and is therefore not so recent).
37. Moomaw, supra note 3.
38. Dunn, supra note 6, at 11.
39. As opposed to the nation-states' actual efficacy. Dunn, supra note 6, at 5.
40. Id. at 11. For a discussion on the development of warfare and the ultimate weap-
ons, see infra notes 68-73and accompanying text.
41. Dunn, supra note 6, at 11.
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rity such as devastation of the environment. 42 Acting alone, individual
nation-states can no longer expect to overcome current national and in-
ternational problems. 43 This process, described as a crisis for nation-
states, challenges a state's sovereignty and requires a change from the
old way. 44 Globalization requires greater cooperation among nation-
states.45 The World Bank's recent reaffirmation of its commitment to
improving the global environment provides evidence of continuing glob-
alization. Pursuant to its articles of incorporation, the World Bank
should not take human rights concerns into account when lending
money. However, the World Bank indicated that improvements in the
global environment directly affect a country's development. 46 Similarly,
the recent international effort to save the troubled Asian economies
demonstrates the necessity of global aid to secure a country from crisis.
As the Asian economies went into a "free fall," the international finan-
cial community cringed in fear. 47 The Asian economies ability to pull
themselves back together requires international financial assistance. 48
Going forward it is anticipated that the international community, espe-
cially foreign banks, will continue to play an impressive role in the
Asian economies.
49
Globalization increases the need for international institutions to
42. Id. (construing THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Andrew
Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, eds., 1992)).
43. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 560. Dunn, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing that
the nation state crisis is as a result of the inability of the nation state to master its own
problems and the origins of the crisis are from two different shifts: first, the decrease in
appeal of the concept of the individuality of the nation state; second, the increase in
awareness of several global, economic, ecologic, military and political challenges that ne-
cessitate world involvement). In order for a nation state to be political active, it needs to
work with other nation states and not individually. Id. at 5.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Attanasio, supra note 2 (indicating that without the existence of international
institutions globalization would continue because capital is exchanged so frequently
across borders that globalization is a necessary evolution). "Japan's support for U.S.
forces, however, expressly excludes weapons and ammunition supplies, although Japan
will transport such materials on behalf of the U.S.. Japan continues to adhere to its 'three
non-nuclear principles' and will not permit nuclear weapons to be brought to Japanese
soil." John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Japan and U.S. Further Develop Defense Guide-
lines to Adapt Them to Post Cold War Conditions, 3 INT'L UPDATE 129 (1997).
46. World Bank Reaffirms Commitment to the Global Environment and a Strong
GEF, M2 PRESSWIRE, April 4, 1998 (indicating that "actions that help the global environ-
ment can help enhance national development and reduce poverty").
47. Les Blumenthal, World Bank Head Says U.S. Can't Just Moralize About Asian
Crisis, MORNING NEws TRIBUNE, Mar. 29, 1998, at B13.
48. The United States' $18 billion additional funding to the IMF was at issue. The
World Bank indicated that the U.S. could not "claim to be a world power without contrib-
uting." Id. Great Britain proposed a multi-million dollar trust fund to aid the Asian banks
to recover. Eileen Ng, Asia-Europe Trust Fund to be Leading Item on ASEM Agenda,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Mar. 29, 1998.
49. Keith B. Richburg, Asia Looks For Cash For Its Ailing Banks; Solution Likely to
Boost Foreign Influence, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1998, at A21.
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implement limitations and regulations.50 These institutions assist in a
smooth transition from a collection of sovereign states to a global com-
munity by establishing universal rules. 5 1 Judicial institutions, such as
the ICJ are key to the development of an international rule of law. 5
2
The judicial institutions must be able to reliably resolve disputes using
the international rule of law.53 Through resolution of disputes, judicial
institutions will also develop new aspects of the rule of law.5
4
At present, a state needs to accept the jurisdiction of the judicial
institution before the rule of law applies to that state. Acceptance of the
50. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26. If international institutions are viewed as per-
vading over nation-states, international institutions should be able to regulate nation-
states to ensure the preservation of global interests. This is similar to state government's
ability to regulate businesses which are connected with public health and welfare. As an
exercise of the state government's police power, it has the ability to regulate business. Cf.
DAN R. WILLIAMS & LARRY GOOD, GUIDE TO THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992 (1994). In
the case of nuclear weapons, international institutions regulating nuclear weapons must
balance between regulating potentially harmful nuclear technology and permitting peace-
ful uses. Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global Information Infrastructure and National
Security, 21 FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 91 (1997) (indicating that this approach is
called "arms control for everyone'). Even the NPT in Article IV(l) states that parties to
the NPT have an "inalienable right' to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear tech-
nology for peaceful purposes. Seth Grae, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's Obliga-
tion to Transfer Peaceful Nuclear Energy Technology: One Proposal of Technology, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1985, 1985 (1996)(indicating that nuclear technology can be applied
in many ways such as cancer treatment or riding crops of pest infestation or nuclear reac-
tors for peaceful energy production).
51. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26 (indicating that the attention is directed to judicial
bodies since the rule of law is so important globally).
Various reasons may help to account for why the economic realm may some-
times precede the recognition of decisions of international tribunals in hu-
man rights and other areas. If one looks at the incentive that nation-states
possess, there are strong reasons to cooperate in the economics area. Fewer
incentives exist to follow the decisions of international tribunals in the hu-
man rights area, in part because their decisions may make nation-states look
bad. Another deterrent may be that human rights cases involve values that
are more fundamental than the utilitarian or efficiency ones that often
dominate cases about economic matters. The fundamentality of human
rights values such as equality or autonomy may render them more central to
a nation-state's culture and sovereignty, consequently making them values
over which nation-states seek to retain their own enforcement power.
Id. at 29.
52. Id. at 26.
53. Id. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 556 (indicating that art of the lack of social
and economic development is due to the financial weakness of the World Trade Organiza-
tion). "The inadequacy of political and social institutions in dealing with the growing
complexity of international social relations, accelerated to a certain extent by the global
demographic explosion of the twentieth century, is also expressed in the generically la-
beled "ungovernability phenomena .... Id. at 559-560.
54. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26. The need to be able to punish international crimes
is apparent with the globalization of drug trafficking. The drug traffic wars has become a
symbol of the ineptitude of nation-states to cooperate to prevent crimes. ). De La Madrid
H., supra note 1, at 560.
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international decision limits the state's sovereignty. 55 However, as the
most viable solution to international concerns, globalization increases
in popularity."Globalization increasingly offers incentives to nation-
states to surrender bits of their sovereignty consensually through trea-
ties to fashion advantageous economic arrangements." 56 Once a state
accepts jurisdiction and the international rule of law, the national
courts should enforce the international decisions. 57
III. WARFARE AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
A. War
Historically, warfare is characterized by the continuing opposition
of offensive and defensive weapons.58 Successful defense of territorial
sovereignty always necessitated a strong military, backed by a nation's
resources and economic wealth. 5 9
55. Attanasio, supra note 2, at 26 (indicating that national courts' acceptance of deci-
sions of international institutions is a very important channel through which interna-
tional law limits state sovereignty).
56. Id. An example is the ECJ. The acceptance of the decisions by the ECJ was grad-
ual. Regionalism is accountable for the success of the ECJ. Another key to the ECJ suc-
cess was the ability of individuals and not just nation states to bring issues forward. The
ICJ's acceptance may be greatly hindered by the fact that its jurisdiction is exclusive to
nation-states. Id. at 24.
57. Id. at 26. "[N]ational courts have often displayed a reluctance to accept the deci-
sions of international tribunals. National courts frequently have displayed greater reluc-
tance in receiving these decisions as precedents than in enforcing judgments by giving
them res judicata effects." Id. at 27.
58. MICHAEL NACHT, THE AGE OF VULNERABILITY: THREATS TO THE NUCLEAR
STALEMATE 55 (1985)(indicating that this pattern includes: measure, countermeasure and
counter-countermeasure).
59. Moomaw, supra note 3.
TABLE: Nation Statistical Information
Country Defense Spending Area Total Popula- GDP Per Life Expectancy
($) (km,) tion (thou- Capita (US$) (years) MIF
sands)
United 271,600,000,000 9363520 271648 18635 72.5/80.7
States
Russia 79,000,000,000 147709 147709 1951 61.7/73.6
China 27,400,000,000 9596961 1243738 440 66.7/70.4
N.Korea 5,300,000,000 99274 45717 8519 67.3/74.9
Iraq 2,600,000,000 438317 21177 2855 64.5/67.5
Iran 2,300,000,000 1633188 71518 1151 67/68
Cuba 270,000,000 110861 11068 1627 73.5/77.5
For defense spending statistics, see
htto://www//infomanare.com/nonor'oliferation~usvsworld




The ability and means by which a State secures itself has direct,
global implications. 60 In the global arena of conflicts between States, a
state confronts an adversary in two ways. The first is "dissuasion by
defense" whereby the defender assembles a strong army and constructs
sturdy battalions.6' The risks and stakes in the outcome differ for each
country involved. If the costs of war are low, a country will act with less
care then if the costs are high.62 A country's risk of retaliation in-
creases as it moves closer to winning, especially if the stakes are high.
The greater the risk of retaliation, the greater the country risks its own
destruction.
63
The second approach is "dissuasion by deterrence" in which the de-
fender uses fear of incredible suffering to confront an aggressor.64 This
approach characterizes warfare as a face-off between countries that op-
pose each other with deterrent threats. 65 This second approach applies
to nuclear weapons. 66 The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is contin-
gent upon the willingness of a state to use them.67
Historically, the development of several "ultimate" weapons charac-
terized deterrent warfare. 68 With each new "ultimate" weapon, new
technology quickly rendered them obsolete and established a new "ul-
timate" weapon in its place. 69 Before World War I, it could take a cen-
mation, see http://www.UN.orgfPubs/CyberSchoolBus/menureso.html. It is interesting to
compare the expense a country allocates to maintain the security of its borders to the
amount it spends to maintain the security of its people.
60. SCOTT D. SAGAN & KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 4
(1995).
61. Id. at 3 (indicating that his is the "defensive ideal" because a defense that no one
believes they could surmount would maintain tranquility in international relations). But
see NACHT, supra note 58, at 56. 'The stone castle, a quintessential defensive weapon,
prompted knights to make offensive forays into the countryside confident that they could
then retreat to their impregnable fortress. In other words, a powerful defensive capability
has often encouraged offensive attack."
62. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3 (stating that "[dieterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend
but through the ability to punish.").
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 4. But see NACHT, supra note 58 (indicating that from 1945 to 1985 no nu-
clear weapon was used in warfare).
67. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 6. As opposed to the acquisition of territory in
warfare, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons tends to increase a state's security more.
Id .at 5.
68. NACHT, supra note 68, at 56.
[Tihe experience of war from ancient times through the end of World War II
reveals one overriding fact: most shots missed their target. Weapons have
always been categorized by their range, lethality, and accuracy. The history
of military technology is the story of man seeking to perfect weapons of
longer range and greater power and accuracy.
Id. at 57.
69. Id. at 56 (indicating that the twentieth century is particularly noteworthy for the
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tury to classify a new weapon as an "ultimate" weapon. 70 Following
World War I, technological innovation rapidly accelerated the aging of
modern weaponry. 71 The advent of nuclear weapons removed the need
to focus technological efforts on improving accuracy. 72 Instead, direct
confrontation of superpowers hallmarked most of the post World War II
period. 73 In particular, the direct confrontation of the United States
and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers, became known as the Cold
War. The majority of the Cold War occurred in Europe.7 4  However,
disputes also arose over the Pacific region.7 5 Although the superpowers
claimed to be at peace, the risk of nuclear war or accident continued to
mount. 76
A remarkable event, the collapse of the Soviet Union, focused in-
ternational concern on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.7 7 In order to understand the full import of that event, it is benefi-
cial to briefly describe the history of the Cold War. The Cold War lasted
for approximately forty years. "The Cold War was not a simple case of
Soviet expansionism and American reaction. Realpolitik held sway in
the Kremlin. Ideology played an important role in shaping their per-
ceptions, but Soviet leaders were not focused on promoting worldwide
revolution. They were concerned mostly with configurations of
power .... "
7 8
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the bomb on Hi-
roshima. 79 Buildings three kilometers away from the explosion burned;
the bomb incinerated anything within a 500 meters its explosion.8 0 On
August 10, 1945 the United States dropped a second bomb on Na-
rapid pace of technological development).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 57.
73. Peter Hayes & Lyuba Zarsky, Pacific Arms Control and Regional Initiatives, in
THE PACIFIC: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 73, 73 (Ranginui Walker & Wil-
liam Sutherland eds., 1988).
74. 'The Cold War was a competition between the United State [sic] and the Soviet
Union over the heads of their West and East European allies." Richard Halloran, The Ris-
ing East, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar. 1, 1996, at 3.
75. Hayes & Zarsky, supra note 73.
76. Id. at 79 (indicating that such factors as "[h]air trigger weapons, rigid and inade-
quate structures of command and control, sectarian rivalries between military services,
fluid political situations..." combined to create the instability).
77. Rattray, supra note 50 (indicating that the break up of the Soviet Union and the
Gulf War were remarkable events that focused attention on proliferation). Weapons of
mass destruction include nuclear weapons. Id.
78. Melvyn P. Leffler, Inside Enemy Archives: the Cold War Reopened, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, July, 17, 1996, at 120.
79. James Chace, Sharing the Atom Bomb: after Hiroshima, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,




gasaki. 81 The two explosions killed more than 150,000 people and in-
jured over 100,000 others. 82 The results stunned the world. America's
possession and use of the bomb terrorized Stalin, adding to his obses-
sion with the security of the Soviet Union.8 3
The American approach to the bomb eroded the American/Soviet
relationship.8 4 Although the United States considered efforts to appease
the Soviet Union and to integrally involve them in the postwar world,
Truman ultimately abandoned the issue to the international commu-
nity.8 5 Klaus Fuchs, a German 6migr6, provided the Russians with a
hand-drawn model of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki and theoretical
plans for making the hydrogen bomb.86 The Soviets tested their first
atomic weapon in 1949 and this set Washington and U.S. scientists in
motion to build something more powerful than the atomic bomb.
8 7
President Truman ardently advocated development of the hydrogen
bomb.88 On November 1, 1952 the United States tested its first hydro-
gen bomb.89 The bomb actually catalyzed the Cold War. 90
The struggle over Germany took center stage in the Cold War.91
Similar struggles ensued in Poland, Hungary, Romania, other Euro-
pean states, and China. 92 The Kremlin sought to gain the respect of and
security from the United States by increasing the Soviet Union's
power.93 Likewise, the United States increased its power and these at-
titudes increased the tensions of the Cold War.94 "[E]ach ... mistook
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Leffler, supra note 78.
84. One intent was to share the basic scientific information but not the actual bomb
design. Chace, supra note 79.
85. Id. (indicating that Truman was very distrustful of the Soviets but that he recog-
nized the need to inform them of the scientific information and that the issue ultimate;y
ended up with the United Nations for resolution).
86. Richard Stengel, Book Review, Brink of Armageddon, TIME MAG., Aug. 21, 1995,
at vol.146, no.8 (reviewing Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen
Bomb).
87. Id. (discussing the unveiling of the plans for the hydrogen bomb).
88. Id. The administration even toyed with the idea of a preemptive strike on the
Soviets with an armada of U.S. planes carrying more than 100 atom bombs to destroy 70
Soviet cities. Id.
89. Id. (indicating that the resulting force was one thousand times more powerful
than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima).
90. Gar Alperovitz Kai Bird, The Centrality of the Bomb, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 22,
1994, at 3.
91. Leffler, supra note 78.
92. Id.(indicating that although the Soviet Union took action in these countries, no
concrete plans for communist take over have been discovered).
93. Id.
94. Id.(indicating that the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Middle East crisis of
1973 characterized these tensions).
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defensive initiatives for aggressive ones."95
In recognition of the tremendous impact of nuclear weapons, mul-
tilateral measures existed during the Cold War to control nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 96 For example, the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT") sought to
stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 97 Furthermore, it necessi-
tated that all countries with peaceful nuclear technology should trans-
fer it to countries without that technology.98 The NPT required that
parties who are capable will work together to further develop peaceful
uses of nuclear technology. 99
The Soviet Union's and United States' concern for their security
and the preservation of their borders and allies, emphasizes the central
role of sovereignty at this time.100 Non superpowers possessed an equal
concern for their sovereignty. In the first fifty years of the nuclear age,
the number of States with nuclear capabilities grew to twelve. 0 1 Be-
tween the years 1940 and 1993, the United States nuclear weapons in-
dustry produced approximately 60,000 warheads.1 02 The spread of nu-
95. Id.(construing Lebow and Stein).
96. Rattray, supra note 50.
97. Grae, supra note 50 (indicating that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons (NPT) in Article IV(l) states that parties to the NPT have an "inalienable
right' to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes).
98. Id.
99. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 7 I.L.M. 809,
art. IV(2) (1968). See generally Rattray, supra note 50.
100. Leffler, supra note 78 (indicating that the Soviet concern for Japan and Germany
were residual from the war and concern for the United States was dictated by the U.S.
wealth and possession of the bomb).
101. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 1. The Soviet Union and the United States
collectively possessed about 60,000 nuclear weapons after only forty years since the first
use of the atomic bomb. NACHT, supra note 68, at 55. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed
and four new states - Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan - were "born nuclear,"
inheriting portions of the Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal. In 1991, after the Gulf War,
[the United States] discovered that Iraq had been only two years or so away from making
atomic bombs, before the Desert Storm attack and the subsequent dismantlement by in-
ternational inspectors of their weapons development facilities. In 1992, Pakistani officials
admitted that they had developed a nuclear weapons capability, after over two decades of
dedicated effort. In 1993, the South African government acknowledged that it had con-
structed a small nuclear arsenal in the 1980s , but said that it had dismantled and de-
stroyed its weapons. North Korea was in the headlines in 1994, when the Pyongyang
government refused to permit full international inspection of its nuclear facilities and the
CIA presented the White House with its estimate that North Korea had processed enough
plutonium for one or more bombs. What will come next? Other potential nuclear powers
appear on the horizon: leading Japanese politicians no longer rule out acquisition of nu-
clear weapons and a growing number of developing nations, such as Iran, Libya, and Al-
geria, seem to have nuclear weapons programs. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at vii-viii.
102. Dan W. Reicher, Nuclear Energy and Weapons, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (Celia Campbell-Mohn, et al, 1993). The Department of Energy manages many of the
facilities for production of nuclear weapons. Since the revelation of safety and environ-
mental hazards, the Department of Energy has either cut back or completely halted pro-
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clear weapons is slow, which is useful to help contain the number of
weapons States. 10 3
After the end of the Cold War and without competing superpowers,
the risk of surprise nuclear attacks and the expense of costly arms races
declined. 104 However, only the naive would neglect the ongoing concern
of states with nuclear weapons. 105 Treaties establish international
norms to deal with the misuse of nuclear technologies 106 but the mere
existence of nuclear weapons serves a potential threat to all. 107 "Even if
never used, a handful of nuclear weapons merely in possession of an un-
friendly country could change a regional balance of power .. ."108 A nu-
clear world commands a different type of philosophy applying to con-
flict. If countries armed with nuclear capabilities participate in war,
they are aware that suffering may be unlimited. 0 9 Instead, the arms
control efforts should focus on achieving the sharing of information
globally on the dissemination of technologies for weapons of mass de-
struction.110
B. Nuclear Technology
Understanding the basic functioning of nuclear energy helps to
conceptualize the implications of nuclear technology."' The key to nu-
clear energy is radiation. 112 The damage to living tissues by radiation
depends on the type of radiation (alpha, beta, or gamma) 113 and the ra-
duction at these facilities.
103. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 1-2.
104. Rattray, supra note 50, at 91.
105. See generally Karsten Prager, China: Waking Up to the Next Superpower, TIME
MAG., Mar.25, 1996, at vol.147, no.13 (discussing China's possible role as the next super-
power). Michael Mandelbaum, Lessons of the Next Nuclear War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.
1, 1995, at 22 (indicating that the collapse of the Soviet Union has increased the demand
for weapons).
106. Rattray, supra note 50, at 92. Warren Christopher, America's Leadership, Amer-
ica's Opportunity, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar. 22, 1995, at 6.
107. Cf. Phil Williams & Paul N. Woessner, The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling,
Scd. AM., Jan. 1996, at 40; Bruce W. Nelan, Formula for Terror, TIME MAG., Aug. 29,
1994, at vol.144, no.9 (indicating that the former Soviet arsenal is leaking into the West,
igniting fears of a brand new nuclear terror).
108. Mandelbaum, supra note 105.
109. SAGAN & WALTZ, supra note 60, at 7.
110. Rattray, supra note 50, at 91.
111. The Department of Energy has attempted to improve the public's understanding
of nuclear technology. U.S Department of Energy, Office of the Press Secretary,
http://apollo.osti.gov/ostii/opennet/document/press/pc8.html.
112. "Some atoms are naturally unstable; their nuclei continuously emit alpha, beta,
or gamma radiation until they achieve a stable state." Reicher, supra note 102.
113. Id. "Alpha radiation consists of positively charged particles made up of two neu-
trons and two protons, while beta particles are electrons. Gamma rays are essentially
highly energetic X-rays except that they are emitted naturally by radioactive substances
instead of machines." Id.
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diation dose. 114 Scientists consider both of these factors when measur-
ing radiation. 115
Nuclear energy has several uses. For instance, nuclear power
plants provide twenty percent of the U.S. electrical needs." 6 Although
harnessing nuclear energy has many purposes, in the mid 1980's there
were three focuses of nuclear research and development: developing di-
rected-energy weapons, exploiting space as a theater of war, and creat-
ing a third generation of nuclear weapons. 117 Even before the discovery
of nuclear technology, 118 it was clear that once the atom's energy was
harnessed the world would be opened to great risks. 19 Since the dis-
covery of nuclear technology, transboundary disputes pervade the in-
dustry. 20 Despite the great security nuclear weapons offer for national
sovereignty, few states possess them.' 2'
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND IT'S ADVISORY OPINION
A. International Court of Justice: General Background
1. The International Court of Justice
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the precursor
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was a product of the 1919
peace settlement. 122 In 1945 the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
114. Id.
115. Id. The unit of measurement for radiation is the rem. Id
116. Id. Nuclear power is second to coal as a source of electricity. Id.
117. NACHT, supra note 68, at 76. President Ronald Reagan emphasized these areas
in his call for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
118. The artificial fissioning of the uranium atom was discovered by Otto Hahn and
Fritz Strassman in 1938. Reicher, supra note 112.
119. Monica J. Washington, Note, The Practice of Peer Review in the International Nu-
clear Safety Regime, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV., 430, 430 (1997).
120. Id. But see NACHT, supra note 58, at 57 (discussing the fact that the military
strategy applied to nuclear weapons dates much further back than when the first nuclear
bomb was dropped in 1945 and the essential elements of that strategy can be found in
classics). The work of Sun Tzu from around 500 B.C. establishes that deception is the ba-
sis of warfare. Sun Tzu elaborates. The ultimate goal of warfare is victory but warfare
should be a quick as possible to decrease costs. Sun Tzu further discusses the strategy.
Id. at 57-8. Strategy has expanded to include unity of command and emphasizing initia-
tive, concentration of forces, maintaining local superiority and maneuverability, flexibil-
ity, and simplicity. Id. at 58.
121. Mandelbaum, supra note 105.
122. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 93 (1984). During the
years of the PCIJ, the Court primarily reflected European values and was a compelling
force in international relations. Id. See also Keith Highet,et al., International Courts and
Tribunals, 31 INT'L LAW. 599, 599 (1997);
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succeeded the Permanent Court of Justice. 123 The ICJ has gone through
several crises arising out of a loss of confidence by the international
community in its abilities. 124 To make itself more attractive as a forum
for dispute settlement, the Court revised its rules in 1978.125 The Stat-
ute of the Court outlines the rules and regulations of the International
Court of Justice 26 and the processes available to the Court.
The ICJ was designated the principle judiciary body of the United
Nations. 127 Currently, the International Court of Justice is increasingly
involved in dispute resolution. 128 As opposed to its previous role as the
last resort to resolution of disputes, countries often include the ICJ as a
step in normal diplomatic negotiations. 129 The Court has three types of
jurisdiction: 13 0 contentious,' 3' incidental, or advisory. 32 Contentious
jurisdiction is for dispute resolution. Only states may be parties to dis-
123. MERRILLS, supra note 122.
124. Georges Abi-Saab, The International Court as a World Court, in FIFTY YEARS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 3, 4 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice,
1996). The first crisis: "the decline of the optional clause," occurred during the late 1940's
into the 1950's as a result of the consistently negative attitude towards the Court by the
Soviet Union and its allies. The USSR refused to submit to the Court's jurisdiction,
whether by acceptance of the optional clause, treaty, or special agreement. Id. The second
crisis was at the start of the 1960's during the move towards decolonization of colonial
territories. After obtaining independence, these former colonies were skeptical of the
Court because it was unfamiliar, complex, and most importantly did not adequately rep-
resent their interests. Following this crisis, the Court took inventory and re-adjusted it-
self to better reflect the changing international community. Id. at 5.
125. Id. at 8-9. The revised Rules incorporated the system of ad hoc Chambers under
Article 17(2). It was the Beagle Channel Case, 15 I.L.M. 634 (1978) in which Chile and
Argentina chose five members of the Court to comprise an arbitral tribunal, that brought
about this change. Following this decision, the Court sought to provide the same oppor-
tunity within the Court. The ad hoc chambers allow parties to a dispute to have a tempo-
rary member in the ICJ. Id. It was anticipated that the ad hoc capacity would decrease
the stability and continuity of the decisions and increase the risk of non-universality of
judges, (ex: Gulf of Maine) but the ad hoc chambers have not been used frequently. Id. at
10.
126. MERRILLS, supra note 122, at 102-03.
127. Id.; Highet, supra note 122.
128. A new crisis arose in 1986 with the Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). Some critics claim that, based on this decision, the West-
ern world no longer had confidence in the Court. The fear was that the Court was apply-
ing contemporary law with an "anti-Western bias." Abi-Saab, supra note 124, at 6. How-
ever, as time passed, the decision in the Nicaragua cases demonstrated the stability and
independence of the Court and thus increased its credibility. Since that time, the Court
has increased its role in dispute settlement. However, it wasn't until 1990 that the Court
allowed itself to be involved in third party intervention. Under Article 62, the Court ad-
mitted to intervention in its judgment in the Land, Island, & Maritime Frontier Dispute
(El Salv. v. Hond.) 1990 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 13). Abi-Saab, supra note 124, at 14.
129. Abi-Saab, supra note 124, at 14.
130. MERRILLS, supra note 122, at 94.
131. Highet, supra note 122.
132. Id.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
putes, 133 with jurisdiction established by consent. 34 Incidental jurisdic-
tion allows the Court, without state consent, to "indicate interim meas-
ures of protection, to allow intervention in a case by third parties and to
interpret a previous judgment."'135 Advisory jurisdiction is the Court's
power to declare advisory opinions at the request of international or-
ganizations. 136 Through its preventive methods, the ICJ promotes the
UN's goals of peace and security.
137
2. The Advisory Jurisdiction of the ICJ
When the Permanent Court was given advisory jurisdiction, 138 it
was a precedent in international law 139 and of uncertain scope.' 40 The
actual Statute of the PCIJ did not provide for advisory jurisdiction in
Article 14.141 After deliberation and attempts to include the provision
in the subsequent versions of Article 14, it was finally included in
1919.142 The PCIJ was very cautious and adopted four articles about the
advisory process. These four articles were a framework for the proce-
dure in advisory cases. The writers were careful to stipulate that the
advisory jurisdiction is an opportunity for parties to settle disputes but
133. MERRILLS, supra note 122, at 94.
134. Id. There are a few ways: 1) Compromissory clause in a treaty before the dispute
arises in multilateral treaties or Subject treaties; 2)by declaration under Article 36(2) of
the Court's Statute, "optional clause" and establishes states' acceptance of jurisdiction on
certain terms and conditions or by special agreement after the dispute has begun. Id. at
94-95. 3) Specialized Agreement. Id. One example of the Court's exercising jurisdiction by
a special agreement is in the Gulf of Maine case. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area, I.C.J. Reports 1984. Judgment was submitted to the Court and
both sides agreed to comply with the verdict. Canada and the United States wanted ju-
risdiction over more extensive ocean areas for fishing and the exploration of commercial
offshore oil deposits. Negotiations had broken down a number of times, and strenuous
political opposition in the United States had begun to interfere. "Adjudication in the
Court provided a way for domestic politicians to resolve the controversy with finality in a
way that did not cause political damage to the incumbent American administration or the
U.S. senators who would have had to vote to give their advice and consent to a boundary
settlement treaty." Martin A. Rogoff, International Politics and the Rule of Law: The
United States and the International Court of Justice, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267, 280-81 (1989).
This special agreement between the U.S. and Canada absolved the Court of any jurisdic-
tional problems that the Court may have had to encounter. The special agreement also
bypassed admissibility requirements and proceeded directly to the merits of the problem.
135. MERRILLS, supra note 122, at 97.
136. Id.
137. Abi-Saab, supra note 124, at 14.
138. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 14.
139. DHARMA PRATAP, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1
(1972).
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2-3. The drafting of the new version of Article 14 was politically motivated.
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the decisions do not bind. 143 The intention of the League of Nations was
to assist the Council and the Assembly in their role, to conciliate and
report on disputes submitted to them, to give authoritative opinions on
legal issues, and to respond to request by organizations for opinions.
144
There were thirteen submissions to the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ
since the first session in June 1922, and the eleventh session in July
1926. Each submission was admitted whether it was oral or written.' 45
The original version of the provision for the advisory jurisdiction
was written in English. The style of writing implied that the Court had
the power to decide which questions it would accept for arbitration.'
46
It has been determined that "the provision.., provided for giving the
Permanent Court advisory jurisdiction in any dispute or question and
at the same time authorized the Council and the Assembly of the
League of Nations to request an opinion from the Court."' 47 The French
version followed. There was a serious discrepancy between the English
and French versions. While the English text used the word "may", the
French text used the French equivalent of "will give". The French text
would render the advisory jurisdiction as an obligation on the Court.
There would be no element of discretion.' 48 In the decision on the le-
gality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the ICJ determined that
it was unnecessary to make a pronouncement on the differences be-
tween the English and French versions.
149
There are certain international and inter-governmental bodies that
have been authorized to request advisory opinions.' 50 Originally, only
two bodies of the League were given the power to request opinions from
the PCIJ.' 5 1 Currently, according to the Charter for the ICJ, only two
principal bodies of the UN are empowered to make this request. There
is a provision in the Charter for other UN bodies and specialized agen-
cies to be given authorization as well.
15 2
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id. at 5. Since then, there has been a gradual evolution of the advisory procedure.
Id. at 2.
145. Id. at 15.
146. Id. at 4 (indicating that the wording "to hear and determine" allowed for the in-
terpretation that the Court could decide which cases to accept).
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id. at 6. (indicating that the French version was never presented to the Drafting
Committee and therefore changes were not made to make the French version consistent
with the English version).
149. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 819.
150. Id. at 51.
151. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT
152. PRATAP, supra note 139, at 51.
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B. The International Court of Justice and It's Advisory Opinion to the
General Assembly
1. Can the ICJ render an Advisory Opinion?
The ICJ rendered an advisory opinion to the U.N. General Assem-
bly on the question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any cir-
cumstance permitted under international law?" The Court performed a
step by step analysis. First, the Court concluded that the General As-
sembly's request contemplated legal issues. 153 Second, the Court certi-
fied that the competence of the General Assembly includes nuclear
weapons. 15 4 The Court concluded that the question had relevance to
several aspects of General Assembly concern "including those relating
to the threat or use of force in international relations, the disarmament
process, and the progressive development of international law."155
Third, since the competency of the General Assembly was not an issue,
the ICJ could offer an advisory opinion on the legal question pre-
sented. 15 6 In paragraph 14 of its' decision, the Court concludes that it
can give an advisory opinion but is not required to pursuant to Article
65, paragraph 1 of the ICJ Statute.157
Finally, the Court explored whether a "compelling reason" dictated
that a decision not be rendered. 58 The Court acknowledged its role as
the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations" and should not
therefore, in principle, refuse to provide an advisory opinion. 5 9 The
Court articulated the "compelling reason" standard for determining
whether the ICJ should not render an advisory opinion. 60 The Court
153. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 817-18, para. 13. See also Perez, supra note
17, at 429-30.
154. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 817, para. 11. The Court reached this deci-
sion by consulting the United Nations Charter articles 10, 11 & 13. See also Perez, supra
note 17, at 429-30.
155. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 817, para. 12.
156. Perez, supra note 17, at 429-30.
157. For a discussion about the difference between whether the Court can or will give
an advisory opinion, see supra note 146 and 149. General Assembly, supra note 16, at
818, para.14.
158. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 818, para. 14 & 15. Perez, supra note 17, at
429-30.
159. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 818, para.14 (construing the United Nations
Charter, art. 92).
160. See e.g., Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints
made against UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 86; Certain Expenses of
the United Nations, art. 17, para.2 of the Charter, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 155; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia not withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1971, p. 2 7 .
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considered the "vague" and "abstract" nature of the original question; 161
whether the question should be addressed by other U.N. bodies accord-
ing to express mandate; 162 whether an advisory opinion by the ICJ
would be of practical assistance; whether an advisory opinion would
undermine progress already made or being made on the question pre-
sented;163 and, whether the advisory opinion would be overall contrary
to the interests of the United Nations. 64 The Court concluded that no
"compelling reason" determined that it should not render an advisory
opinion. 1
65
In the history of the ICJ, the Court has never refused based on its
discretionary power to render an advisory opinion. The PCIJ once de-
clined to render an advisory opinion. The PCIJ declined to advise on
the question because "the question directly concerned an already exist-
ing dispute, one of the States parties to which was neither a party to
the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member of the League of Na-
tions, objected to the proceedings, and refused to take part in any
way."1
66
2. What Is The Relevant Applicable Law?
Next, the Court determined that the law applicable to the case "is
that relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Char-
ter and the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct
of hostilities, together with any specific treaties on nuclear weapons
that the Court might determine to be relevant."167 The Court reached
this conclusion by analyzing three issues. First the Court analyzed the
right to life according to the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights. 16 It determined that the right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of one's life applies also in hostilities, such as nuclear war.169 To reach
a determination of an arbitrary deprivation of life, the Court concluded
that it must analyze the "law applicable in armed conflict."'170 Second,
161. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 818-19, para. 15.
162. Id. at 819, para. 18.
163. Id. at 819, para. 17.
164. Id. at 819, para.17.
165. Id. at 819, para. 19. The Court voted thirteen votes to one to comply with the re-
quest for an advisory opinion. Judge Oda rendered the one vote against. Id. at 831.
166. Id. at 818, para. 14 (discussing Status of Eastern Carelia, P.C.I.J., Series B, No.5).
167. Id. at 821, para. 34.
168. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368,
art. 6, para. 1 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR] (guaranteeing the right to life) and art. 4 (indi-
cating that certain provisions may be derogated in times of national emergency).
169. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 820, para. 25.
170. Id. 'Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in
warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the
Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself." id.
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the Court determined that the prohibition against genocide17 ' applied
only when an intent to destroy a particular group existed.
172
Third, the Court addressed whether certain agreements 173 required
protection for the environment at all times, even during times of war.
The Court acknowledged the pervasive concern for the environment but
concluded the agreement did not intend to restrain the ability of a state
to defend itself.174 The Court determined that the Additional Protocol
I175 provided further protection for the environment from "widespread,
long-term and severe [damage]" and prohibits "methods and means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause such dam-
age;" and prohibits "attacks against the natural environment by way of
reprisals."'176 In addition, the Court concluded that the environment
should be considered when implementing the law applicable in armed
conflict. 177 Ultimately the Court concluded, with respect to the envi-
ronment, that "the existing international law relating to the protection
and safeguarding of the environment does not specifically prohibit the
use of nuclear weapons, it indicates important environmental factors
that are properly to be taken into account in the context of the imple-
mentation of the principles and rules of the law applicable in armed
conflict."1
78
3. Unique Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons?
After determining the law applicable in the case, the Court made a
171. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S., art. II (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion].
172. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 820, para. 26.
173. The agreements cited for protection of the environment include: Additional Proto-
col I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protocol of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, art. 35, para. 3
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (prohibiting the em-
ployment of "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment"); the Con-
vention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifi-
cation Techniques, May 18, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 88, art. I (prohibiting the use of weapons
which have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects" on the environment); the Stock-
holm Declaration of 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416, principle 21; and the Rio Declaration of 1992,
31 I.L.M. 818, principle 2 (expressing the common conviction of the States concerned with
a duty "to ensure the activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.").
174. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 821, para. 30. "Respect for the environment
is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the
principles of necessity and proportionality."
175. Additional Protocol I, supra note 173, arts. 35, paras. 3, 55.
176. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 821, para. 31.
177. Id. at 821, para. 32 (considering Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed
Conflict, G.A. Res. 47/37, Nov.25, 1992).
178. Id. at 821, para. 33.
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special note to take into account the "unique characteristics of nuclear
weapons."1 79 The Court created a laundry list of the catastrophic capa-
bilities of nuclear weapons including: destruction of civilization, de-
struction of the planet's ecosystem; negative affects on health, agricul-
ture, natural resources, and demography; damage to future
generations, environment, food and marine ecosystems; cause genetic
defects and illness.180 In order to render an accurate opinion, the Court
indicated that it must take these characteristics into consideration. 181
4. The Final Verdict'
8 2
First, the Court unanimously concluded that "neither customary
nor conventional international law [specifically authorized] the threat
or use of nuclear weapons."' 83 Second, the Court concluded eleven votes
to three that "neither customary nor conventional international law
comprehensive[ly] and universally] prohibit[ed] the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons as such."' 84 The Court concluded unanimously that:
third, "[a] threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is
contrary to article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter and
that fails to meet all the requirements of article 51 is unlawful"'185 and
fourth "[a] threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible
with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed con-
flict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international hu-
manitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and
other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons."'186
Fifth the Court concluded seven votes to seven, with the President
casting his vote that:
[iut follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and
in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
179. Id. at 821-22, para. 35.
180. Id. at 822, para. 35.
181. Id. at 822, para. 36.
182. Highet, supra note 122, at 601.
183. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 831, para. 105, art. (2)(A). See also Richard
A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 65 (1997) (citing the Case at para. 98-103). Cf. NACHT, supra note
68, at 118 (indicating that from 1959 to 1974 the United States and Soviet Union created
more than a dozen agreements, some involving other countries; yet there was no signifi-
cant change in the rapid increase of nuclear weapons around the world). With this situa-
tion, it is no wonder that the ICJ cannot make a pronouncement on the legality of nuclear
weapons. Id.
184. General Assembly, supra note 16, at 831, para. 105, art. (2)(B). Judges Sha-
habuddeen, Weeramantry, and Koroma voted against. Id.
185. Id. at art. (2)(C).
186. Id. at art. (2)(D). The President of the Court, in an unprecedented move, cast the
determining vote.
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[h]owever, in view of the current state of international law, and
of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake.18
7
Sixth, the Court unanimously determined "[t]here exists an obligation
to pursue in good faith and bring to an conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective in-
ternational control."188
C. A Relevant ICJ Decision
In 1993, the World Health Organization (W.H.O) requested an ad-
visory opinion from the ICJ. 189 The ICJ made a ground-breaking deci-
sion by refusing, for the first time, to issue an advisory opinion. 190 The
W.H.O sought an opinion on the following question: "In view of the
health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by
a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations un-
der international law including the W.H.O Constitution?"'191 The ICJ
declined to respond to the request, determining that the request was
beyond WHO's competence. 192
The Charter of the United Nations' 93 gave to the W.H.O. the
authority to request advisory opinions from the ICJ. They were limited
to legal questions within the competence of the W.H.O.19 The ICJ
adopted a three part test applicable to requests for an advisory opinion
by a Specialized Agency. First, the Agency must be appropriately em-
powered according to the U.N. Charter to make that request. Second,
the question at issue in the request must be of a legal nature. Third,
187. Id. at art. (2)(E). Vice-President Schwebel and Judges Oda, Guillaume, Sha-
habuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgens voted against. Id.
188. Id. at art. (2)(F).
189. Legality of the Use By a State of Nuclear Weapons In Armed Conflict, 1993 I.C.J.
467 (Sept. 13) (Request for Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter W.H.O. Request).
190. Maureen Bezuhly, et al, International Health Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 645, 646 (1996);
Perez, supra note 17, at 426. The ICJ in it's advisory decision to the General Assembly
indicated that:
[t]here has been no refusal, based on the discretionary power of the Court, to
act upon a request for advisory opinion in the history of the present Court; in
the case concerning the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in
Armed Conflict, the refusal to give the World Health Organization the advi-
sory opinion requested by it was justified by the Court's lack of jurisdiction
in that case.
General Assembly, supra note 16, at 818, para.14.
191. Id. at 468.
192. Id.
193. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 2.
194. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 2.
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the question must pertain to the competence of the Agency making the
request. 195
Refusing to grant jurisdiction, the ICJ determined that the W.H.O.
was requesting an advisory opinion outside the scope of its legal compe-
tence. 196 "[T]he ICJ interpreted Article 2 of the W.H.O. Constitution to
give the W.H.O. competence only to 'deal with the effects on health of
the use of nuclear weapons,' and it found that regardless of whether the
use of nuclear weapons was legal, they would have the same conse-
quences on health and the environment."'197 The Court determined that
the issue presented by the W.H.O represented entirely a legal question
on the use of nuclear weapons 198 and was about their health effects. 199
Pursuant to the Specialized Agency policy, the Court implied that,
therefore, only the General Assembly has the competency to request
advisory opinions on these legal questions.200
The dissent argued that the majority of the Court had not under-
stood the question presented by the W.H.O. Judge Shahabudden inter-
preted the W.H.O's question to ask for an opinion whether the use of
nuclear weapons violated W.H.O's Constitution. 201 Judges Koroma and
Weeramantry found that W.H.O's question did not concern the general
illegality but specifically illegality with regards to W.H.O's activities.
The areas concerned 1) health obligations of the State; 2) environmental
obligations of the State; and 3) obligations imposed on States by the
W.H.O Constitution.
202
V. DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
"Reaching as far back in history, ranging over as many civilizations
and cultural eras, as it does, international law by its very nature is the
product of change. All law arises from an admixture of social, political,
195. Highet, supra note 122, at 601.
196. John Kim, International Institutions, 31 INT'L LAW. 671, 674 (1997).
197. Perez, supra note 17, at 426-27 (construing the Agreement between the United
Nations and World Health Organization, G.A. Res. 124(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d. Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/124, art. X, para. 2 (1947) (entered into force July 10, 1948), and the W.H.O. Re-
quest at para. 21).
198. Highet, supra note 122, at 602.
199. Bezuhly, supra note 190 (indicating that the Court agreed that the WHO was
authorized to confront the effects on health of the use of nuclear weapons).
200. Perez, supra note 17, at 427 (construing the W.H.O. Request at para. 30 quoting
the Court as saying that "any other conclusion would render virtually meaningless the
notion of a specialized agency") The Court further elaborated on the principle of specialty
by stating that specialized agencies "are invested by the States which create them with
powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those
States entrust to them." W.H.O. Request at para. 25.
201. Bezuhly, supra note 190.
202. Id.
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cultural, and ideological ingredients." 203
Sovereignty and nonintervention principles 20 4 change based on
global circumstances. 20 5 Three points in history exist when intervention
was viewed as relatively acceptable: first, the period immediately fol-
lowing the Napoleonic Wars; second, the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury; and third, at the close of the nineteenth century. 20 6 In between
these three points, the permissibility of intervention declined, in 1640,
1880, and at the beginning of the twentieth century.20 7 Then in the
mid-1960s, the world began to reconsider the legality of intervention.
20 8
These periods in time indicate that "system-transforming wars" 20 9 in-
fluence the favorably of intervention.
Currently the world is experiencing a change in the dynamics of in-
ternational relations and the principle of sovereignty; intervention prin-
ciples depend on the current global circumstances and the definition of
sovereignty. 210 Two factors influenced this change: the end of the Cold
War 2 11 and the change in the nature of conflicts. 212 Today sovereignty
continues to change based on economic interdependence, technological
advances, communication and transportation advances, the power and
range of modern weapons, and the universal threat of nuclear weap-
ons.
213
During the Cold War, the international paradigm differed consid-
erably compared to today. The influence of the superpowers created an
emphasis on deterrence with nuclear weapons. 214 The sovereign of a
state sought to increase the ability of the nation-state to win wars. 21
5
203. HENRY L. BRETTON, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 160-61
(1986).
204. The traditional view is that "sovereignty and nonintervention are part and parcel
of the same 'doctrinal mechanism to express the outer limits of permissible influence that
one state may properly exert upon another."' Charles W. Kegley, Jr., et al, The Rise and
Fall of the Nonintervention Norm: Some Correlates and Potential Consequences, 22
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 82 (1998).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 84.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 84-85 (indicating that "the largest inflection points in this time series ap-
pear in the wake of major periods of global instability suggesting that discontinuities have
been precipitated by changes in levels of interstate aggression in the world."). Id. at 85.
210. Id. at 84-85.
211. For a discussion, see infra notes 77-1012 and accompanying text.
212. Robert C. Loehr & Eric M. Wong, The U.N. and Humanitarian Assistance: Am-
bassador Jan Eliasson, J. INT'L AFF., Winter, 1995, at 491 (indicating that conflicts have
changed in that they "are now concentrated in the realm of civil war and internal con-
flict.").
213. Bretton, supra note 203, at 165.
214. Jim Falk, War and Peace Studies: Towards a Peace Paradigm, in THE PACIFIC:
PEACE, SECURITY & THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 205, 207 (1988).
215. Id. at 207.
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The global approach treated nation-states as single actors, not as part
of a functioning whole.
216
Since the end of the Cold War the lack of a bipolar world decreases
the need for nuclear weapons competition. The global community.is
opening its eyes to global human rights, environmental concerns, and
economic issues. In response, nation-states recognize the need to coop-
erate to address these issues. To achieve this end, an independent body
must facilitate this process by identifying the concerns, the goals, and
the means.
Amomg other things, the lack of a competent system for implemen-
tation of international nuclear safety standards leads to faulty interna-
tional regulation of nuclear weapons.217 Nation-states cooperated to es-
tablish a peer review process to promote domestic implementation of
internationally recognized nuclear safety standards. The peer review
process evaluates the conditions and safety procedures of a nation-
state's nuclear power plants. 218 This system is not self enforcing and the
control of violent conflicts resides with the nation-state rather than in-
ternational institutions. 21 9 Without militia provided by the nation-
states, the international institutions are close to powerless to respond to
violent conflicts. 220 Second, the reluctance of nation-states to relinquish
control of standards to an international body maintains the continuing
belief that such decisions should be determined by the national gov-
ernment.
221
The ICJ, in its advisory opinion to the General Assembly, should
have taken control of the global issue of nuclear weapons. The respon-
sibility of the ICJ is to identify the needs of and concerns of the interna-
tional community in order to create an international standard. The
Court needs to take a position on the legality of the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons when a state existence is at stake.
Too many pleas for consistency or against inevitable selectivity
amount to arguing that the United Nations should not inter-
vene anywhere unless it can intervene everywhere... But in
light of genocide, misery , and massive human rights abuses in
war zones around the world, should Pontius Pilate be the model
216. Id. at 208.
217. Washington, supra note 119, at 440.
218. Id. at 430. Nuclear safety has two different forms of peer review. The first in-
volves "the technical, on-site review of nuclear installations by nuclear plant operators.
This method is most frequently used by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
World Association of Nuclear Operators, and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
The second peer review process monitors state compliance with the provisions of the Con-
vention on Nuclear Safety." Id. at 431.
219. Attanasio, supra note 2.
220. Id. However, international institutions have control over capital which has a
great influence on the nation state. Id. at 26.
221. Washington, supra note 119, at 441.
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for both American and the international response? The fatalism
and isolationism that flow from most objections to humanitarian
intervention are as distressing as the situation in the countries
suffering from ethnic conflict where such an action is re-
quired... A purely non interventionist position amounts to ab-
stention from the foreign policy debate.222
In order to be fair to the international populace and to be a credible
international judicial institution, 223 the ICJ needs to opine. 224
The ICJ determined that ultimately it could not conclude whether
the threat or use of nuclear weapons was illegal under circumstances
when the safety of a state is at stake. The Court fails to realize that
neutrality is a false ideal. 225 The Court's inability to reach a decision
really says a great deal. The Court used neutrality to promote the ad-
vancement of the international community's goal towards the oblitera-
tion of nuclear weapons. 226 Neutrality is usually applied to the political
ideals of a state. 227 If a state wants to remain autonomous instrumen-
tal neutrality is not the way, the state must "promote the autonomous
way of life non-neutrality by guaranteeing that certain valuable options
are made available to its citizens."228 This analysis should be applied to
the ICJ's neutral position.
Often it is argued that either a state can chose one of two options:
neutrality among conflicting ideals or coercive imposition of its position
on those that do not agree.229 In this instance, an institution without
enforcement power, like the ICJ, might opt for neutrality and thereby
acknowledge its impotence. However, coercion is not the only means to
solidify power. 230 "[P]romotion of moral ideals can be highly controver-
222. Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions Af-
ter the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 448 (1997).
223. See supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text, discussing the role of interna-
tional judicial institutions.
224. It is suggested that a lack of international law and international engagement
were contributing factors in the crisis in Yugoslavia. Orford, supra note 222, at 444.
225. Cf. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After
All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1352 (1991).
226. Id. at 1354 (indicating that non-neutral defenses of neutrality is when "the state
seeks to promote a particular way of life by means of its neutrality: This may be termed
instrumentality or weak neutrality, or neutrality as a means.').
227. Id. (construing Joseph Raz).
228. Id. (construing Joseph Raz).
229. Id. at 1364. The argument is construed: "1) the ends of political power must be
justified to those subject to it, and coercion is the opposite of such justification; 2) promo-
tion of a moral ideal is necessarily coercive; 3) therefore neutrality is the only reasonable
response to the fact of pluralism." Id. at 1366.
230. Id. at 1367 (indicating that not every act by a state to promote an ideal needs to
be coercive).
The state can promote or foster a particular way of life in a number of nonco-
ercive ways. For example, the establishment clause's prohibition against
state promotion of religious ways of life is not limited to coercive means of
26:4
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
sial and, in certain cases, can threaten the basic structure of political
association." 23 ' The abolition of slavery in the United States is an ex-
ample. 232 The ICJ would increase its role in the international commu-
nity as a guarantee for redress of wrongs if it takes a stand as "a strong
force in place with the means and mandate to thwart."
233
The Court's decision was not actually neutral. 234 The Court's deci-
sion seems very narrow. 235 However, this narrowness misleads because
three out of the six judges did not support the majority simply because
the majority decision did not conclude that existing international law
banned the threat or use of nuclear weapons. "[Tihe absence of a clear
majority reflects the Court's failure fully to resolve the legal status of
nuclear weapons."236 To reach its decision, the Court considered certain
areas of international law: human rights and genocide, and environ-
mental law.237 The implication of the Court's "neutrality" on these
global issues is detrimental.
A. The Case and Environmental Law
With rapid population growth across the globe, the impact that
humans have on the earth increases significantly. 238 Since environ-
mental degradation continous at a remarkable pace, individual nations
can no longer act alone and expect to improve environmental quality.239
promotion. Thus, such noncoercive ways of promoting religion as tax breaks
and financial aid for parochial schools and placing a creche in a courthouse
have been found unconstitutional.
Id.
231. Id. at 1369 (discussing promotion of ideals by states). I believe it is applicable to
the International Court of Justice as well.
232. Id. at 1369.
233. Orford, supra note 222, at 450 (construing Fernando Teson).
234. Several of the resolutions were adopted with a number of negative votes. With
these negative votes, the ICJ decision is arguably not opinio juris.
235. Highet, supra note 122, at 601.
236. Falk, supra note 183, at 64.
237. Timothy J .Herverin, Case Comment, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons: Environmental and Humanitarian Limits on Self Defense, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1277, 1278 (1997).
238. Futrell, supra note 12 (indicating that "[niew technologies.., have allowed us to
dig deeper, cut faster, and reroute large quantities of water."). De La Madrid H., supra
note 1, at 560 (indicating that the rapid deterioration of the planet and it's natural re-
sources has severe implications for sustainable development as the human population
continues to grow rapidly).
239. Futrell, supra note 12. See also Marcia L. Goldstein, et al., Current Issues in
Bankruptcy and Environmental Law, 474 PLIILit 651, 675 (1993).
The public's concern with the presence of hazardous and toxic waste sites
that endanger the environment and public health has prompted the federal
and numerous state governments to enact a variety of environmental protec-
tion legislation. Increasingly, the significant costs of complying with these
regulations are forcing industrial polluters to seek protection under title 11
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Sovereignty will have to be second to the quest to ameliorate environ-
mental problems and create treaties in that direction.240  Nations
should be concerned about the environment not only because it causes
threats to human health and ecosystems in the their nation,241 but
there are more global concerns that result.242 Instead, nations tend to
hide behind a the cloak of sovereignty and keep their environmental
concerns from the rest of the world.
243
Before 1972, only a few international agreements existed address-
ing resources shared across borders, such as water or wildlife; setting
liability rules for oil spills; or regulating fisheries and whaling. These
agreements barely influenced nation-states' sovereignty. In 1972, at
the time of the UN-sponsored Stockholm Conference on the Human En-
vironment, the global community acknowledged that the nature of the
global environmental problem differed from that of trade and tradi-
tional international law. The international community concluded that
this required a new approach.
244
The world recognizes the threat to the environment of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons making. 245 The Chernobyl accident in
of the United States Code.... As the federal Environmental Protection
Agency (the "EPA") and various state agencies have sought to enforce envi-
ronmental protection legislation within these bankruptcy cases, the conflict
between the Bankruptcy Code and federal and state environmental statutes
has become apparent.
Id. Examples of federal environmental statutes are the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.§§ 9601-57 (1982)
("CERCLA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
87 (1983 & Supp. 1985) ('RCRA").
240. Moomaw, supra note 3, at 8 (concluding that "[miost importantly, national
boundaries are porous to pollution or global environmental degradation, and no amount of
military force or economic power can fully insulate a country from their consequences.
Environmental diplomacy and the negotiation process to create treaty and soft-law re-
gimes often differ from traditional diplomatic practices. International and global envi-
ronmental problems promote alliances that are often quite different from those formed to
address traditional diplomatic issues. International environmental treaties often commi
[sic] nations to an ongoing process instead of, or in addition to, the achievement of specific
treaty goals. Environmental problems can be classified into four useful categories to
analyze the implications for diplomacy and national sovereignty: 1) domestic, internal is-
sues, 2) common concern assets, 3) transboundary movements of resources, pollution and
migratory species, and 4) global and commons issues.").
241. Futrell, supra note 12 (indicating that the positive side effect of the trouble with
the environment for the United States is that it creates more jobs for environmental engi-
neers and experts in the field).
242. For example, the environmental degradations in the United States have reper-
cussions in other countries. Futrell, supra note 12. As resources across the world de-
crease in availability, global competition has risen for those scarce resources left. This
could possibly lead to war. Id. Current environmental problems will create bigger prob-
lems for future generations. Id.
243. Moomaw, supra note 3, at 14-15.
244. Id. at 8.
245. Kenneth J. Garcia, The Towns the Bomb Built/War Threat Eases-Economic Fall-
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April 1986 helped t open the eyes of the world to the horrors of a nu-
clear accident. 246 After the Chernobyl incident, some countries even
abandoned plans to develop new nuclear power plants. 247 The interna-
tional community knows of the dangers of diverting nuclear materials
for the use of nuclear weapons and established international nuclear
safeguards to monitor and halt the diversion of nuclear materials.
248
The ICJ advisory opinion and wide sentiment indicate, that the effects
of a nuclear war would devastate the natural environment. 249 The
every day effect of nuclear testing and nuclear weapons manufacturing
receives less acknowledment. 250 But these threats continue to grow as
nuclear weapons exist.
The Court identified several environmental norms and rules that
address these threats. 251 The Court acknowledged the importance of a
sound environment for the quality of life and health of those born and
unborn; yet, the Court indicated that despite these concerns the norms
established by treaties do not place obligations of total restraint on
countries. 252 The Court concluded "there was no general prohibition on
the threat or use of nuclear weapons."25 3 In its analysis of the human
right to life, the Court indicated that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the Charter of the United Nations, which
uphold this right, apply during times of peace and war. However, the
Court did not consider the International Covenant on Economic, Cul-
tural and Social Rights which guarantee the right to health, 254 among
out Begins, S.F. CHRON., April 11, 1995, at Al.
246. Washington, supra note 119, at 432 (indicating that "under ordinary operating
conditions only negligible amounts of radioactive materials escape from a reactor, more
dangerous quantities of these materials can enter the atmosphere due to accidents or to
the inadequate disposal of nuclear waste").
247. LKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 539 (1994).
248. Washington, supra note 119, at 432 (indicating that the danger of nuclear weap-
ons has been confronted by the international community for some time and the interna-
tional community is just starting to take steps towards preventing damages by peaceful
uses of nuclear energy). "[N]uclear weapons proliferation is not likely to be halted until
there is a total renunciation of nuclear power for whatever purpose, on the part of the nu-
clear weapons States especially...." GURUSWAMY, supra note 247.
249. GURUSWAMY, supra note 247, at 985.
250. Id. The damage to the environment is caused by above ground and underground
testing which release radioactive gases into the air and risk contaminating ground water.
Nuclear wastes have long term environmental effects as well.
251. "[T]he Court cited Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949
(Protocol I), the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
(RIO 2), and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration (Stockholm 21)."
252. Herverin, supra note 237, at 1279.
253. Kim, supra note 196, at 674.
254. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 6
I.L.M. 360, art. 12 (1967) [hereinafter ICESC].
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other rights, 255 which nuclear weapons and the externalities thereof
derogate. Nuclear contamination and fall-out impact the human right
to health.
256
Since the ICJ refused to declare the outright illegality of nuclear
weapons no matter the circumstances, it subordinates 1) the long term
survival of our planet (in essence the security of each sovereign nation),
2) the rights encompassed in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, and 3) the
purpose of the United Nations as embodied in the United Nations Char-
ter to the sovereignty concerns of military security of each nation.
B. The Case and Human Rights
The international community has become more sensitive to global
human rights.257 The number of international institutions providing for
the safeguard of human rights has increased. 258 Sovereignty and the
principles of nonintervention may excuse countries that violate interna-
tional human rights laws.259 However, the international unveiling of
violations of human rights (especially genocide) 260 has greatly reduced
the nation-state's ability to claim, in the name of sovereignty, immunity
from international accountability for domestic actions upon their own
citizens. 26 1 In fact, the majority of threats to human rights occurs at the
state or local level. 262
It is argued that states should take collective action in favor of sup-
porting human rights, even if that action may cause some controversy;
instead of remaining inactive and thus incapable of providing assis-
tance to combat brutality or towards achieving democracy. 263 If older
notions of nation-state sovereignty and non intervention are abandoned
in favor of a more globalist perspective, the international community
will be better enabled to aid peoples in need of assistance.
264
255. Consider also the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific process. Id. at art.
15(1)(b).
256. ICCPR, supra note 168.
257. D'Amato, supra note 29, at 47 (indicating that the "breakthrough events for hu-
man rights were the Nuremberg trials following the Second World War (establishing that
genocide was a war crime) and the Genocide Convention of 1948 (establishing genocide as
a crime under international law whether committed in time of war or peace)." Id. De La
Madrid H., supra note 1, at 556 (indicating that the United Nations has postponed eco-
nomic and social concerns in favor of focusing on peace and international safety).
258. De La Madrid H., supra note 1, at 558.
259. BRETTON, supra note 31.
260. D'Amato, supra note 29, at 47 (quoting Louis Henkin as describing that the list
has expanded beyond genocide to include apartheid, slavery, extra-judicial killing or dis-
appearances, torture, and inhuman treatment).
261. Id.
262. Orford, supra note 222, at 449 (construing Fernando Teson).
263. Orford, supra note 222 (construing Fernando Teson).
264. Orford, supra note 222, at 450 (construing Fernando Teson).
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Nuclear deterrence centers on the idea "that there are certain in-
terests that, if threatened, justify the incineration of hundreds of mil-
lions of innocents."265 Some critics point out that there is a "numbed ac-
ceptance" of the moral aspect of the nuclear weapons dilemma. 266 The
ICJ seems to have accepted this numbness by enlisting its neutrality on
the ultimate decision of the legality of nuclear weapons overall.
The Court approached its human rights analysis in two ways.
First, the Court discussed the right to life and second, the Court dis-
cussed genocide. When applied to nuclear weapons, the Court deter-
mined that human rights norms about the right to life267 must be ana-
lyzed under the law of armed conflict. 268 The Court further concluded
that international genocide norms would prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons if there was an identifiable intent to destroy human groups.
269
The Court concluded that with the use of nuclear weapons no such
clearly identifiable intent existed. Overall, the Court reached the deci-
sion "there was no general prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear
weapons."27
0
The Court determined that it could not reach a conclusion whether
the use or threat of nuclear weapons would be unlawful in the instance
of self-defense when a State's existence was at issue.27
1
C. Economics
The impact of nuclear weapons on human rights and the environ-
ment are greatly affected by the economics of a sovereign state because
there is a close link between the economic development of a country and
its military capabilities and strategy.272 The amount of money spent on
nuclear weapons in one country directly implicates that money as not
being spent for other internal, humanitarian objectives.273 "There [is]
no need to manufacture new atomic bombs without letup and to appro-
priate twelve billion dollars for defense in a year in which no military
threat [is] to be expected for the nearest future."274 For example a
265. Richard Tanter, Preconditions for De-linking Australia from the Nuclear System,
in THE PACIFIC: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 141, 148 (Ranginui Walker &
William Sutherland eds., 1988).
266. Id. (indicating that "[alt the heart of the argument is the belief that 1939 will
come again, and only the threat of nuclear annihilation will stop a Hitler.").
267. that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life," ICCPR, supra note 168.
268. Herverin, supra note 237, at 1278.
269. Id.
270. Kim, supra note 196.
271. Highet, supra note 122, at 601.
272. Kinhide Mushakoji, Preface, in THE PACIFIC: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR
ISSUE (Ranginui Walker & William Sutherland eds., 1988).
273. For a international statistical comparison, see supra note 59.
274. ALBERT EINSTEIN, OUT OF MY LATER YEARS: THE SCIENTIST, PHILOSOPHER AND
MAN PORTRAYED THROUGH HIS OWN WORDS 139 (1956).
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study found that American people are concerned with the deficit and
unnecessary government spending; yet, despite the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. currently spends at least
$33 billion a year on nuclear weapons and weapons related activities
about 13 percent of all military spending. 275 Since World War II, nu-
clear weapons technology has consumed approximately one third of all
U.S. defense spending. 276 This is a result of a lack of strong and consis-
tent Congressional oversight, skewed intelligence estimates, pervasive
secrecy, partisan politics and interservice rivalries.
277
The central challenge to achieving international cooperation is
global economic liberalization. 278 "Compared to the international mar-
ket, the national market is identified as something that is 'ours,' 'in
here,' and, in that sense, 'private,' and part of our 'national sovereignty.'
In contrast, compared to the national market, the international market
associates with something that is 'theirs,' 'out there,' and, in that sense,
'public,' and a possible intrusion on and menace to our 'national sover-
275. An Ongoing study by the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, Atomic
Audit: What the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Really Cost (visited Mar. 5, 1998)
<http://www.brook.edu/PA/PRESSREUISCHWARTZ.HTM>.
Compare this spending to spending on other government programs for the elderly or dis-
abled.
A comparison of Medicare and Medicaid as a function of U.S. Budget
(compared to Unemployment and Compensation)
Health Coverage 1962 1978 1997
$ amt*/% of GDP $ amt*/ % of GDP $amt*/ % of GDP
Medicare $ 0.1/ less than 0.05% $10.7/ 0.5% $95.6 /1.2%
Medicaid $0 /0% $24.3 /1.1% $207.9 / 2.6%
Unemployment & Com-
pensation $3.5 /0.6% $10.8 /0.5% $20.6 /0.3%
* The amount of money allocated to these programs is in the billions of dollars.
The information obtained for this chart was provided by the Congressional Budget Office
in the Table E-12: Outlays for Entitlements & the Mandatory Spending, Fiscal Years
1962-1997 (as a percentage of GDP) (visited Mar. 3, 1998)
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index+319&sequence=O&from=7#e-12> and Table E-13
Outlays for Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending, Fiscal Years 1962-1997 (in bil-
lions of dollars) (visited Mar. 5, 1998)
<http:www.cbo. gov/showdoc.cfm?index+319&sequence=O&from=7#e- 13>.
276. An Ongoing study by the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, Atomic
Audit: What the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Really Cost (visited Mar. 5, 1998)
<http://www.brook.edu/PA/PRESSRELJSCHWARTZ.HTM>.
277. Id.
278. Globalization has increased the amount of regional institutions for economic, po-
litical, juridical, and social integration. De La Madrid H., supra note 1. These regional
institutions include the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the
Forum of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the South American Common
Market. Id. at 555-56. There has been a similar movement on an even grander interna-
tional scale. The more universal institutions include: the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Id. at 556.
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eignty.' 27 9 Globalization combines the "old liberal belief in economic in-
terdependence with new technological developments that have intensi-
fied the pace of economic interdependence. Globalization shares with
the liberal faith in economic interdependence the goal of eroding state
sovereignty to build connections and interests between people of the
world."280 "The problem is that economics is still an evolving science.
The possibility of a second Great Depression, this time in a world with
nuclear weapons, is simply unacceptable."
28'
VI. CONCLUSION
Countries have been moving towards disarmament and denucleari-
zation as part of the nation-states' search for a national identity consis-
tent with development and peace. 28 2 Since, the ICJ considered itself
able to address several aspects of the nuclear weapons legality debate;
does it make sense that it could not render the ultimate decision of total
legality of nuclear weapons when the survival of a nation-state is at
stake? The ICJ identified the role of the ICCPR and United Nations
Charter in times of peace and war (leaving out the ICESCR);283 yet
failed to consider the binding Covenants in its final analysis, consider-
ing only the law of armed conflict. Surely, if the Court considered these
documents, it would have found itself capable to render an ultimate de-
cision. By not making a determination as to the legality of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons when the survival of a state is at stake, the
Court impliedly admits to its doubt of the effectiveness of its determina-
tions and ultimately of international law in general. For if the Court
was certain that by declaring nuclear weapons completely illegal, that
all states would comply; there would be no reluctance to indicate that
there is no use of nuclear weapons.
28 4
Cyclically, if the ICJ does not make conclusive opinions it dimin-
ishes the stability of globalization and in turn a decrease in globaliza-
279. Cao, supra note 5, at 211.
280. Fidler, supra note 36.
281. Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does
What It Is Supposed To Do (and No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1536 (1997).
282. Mushakoji, supra note 272, at xi.
283. It is interesting to note that despite the list of terrible results of nuclear war,
many of which include health risks, the ICJ declined to render an opinion on the WHO's
request for an advisory opinion.
284. In the Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Schwebel, he identifies this thought.
[Als long as what are sometimes styled as 'rogue States' menace the world
(whether they are or are not parties to the NPT), it would be imprudent to
set policy on the basis that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is unlawful
'in any circumstance'. Indeed, it may not only be rogue States but criminals
or fanatics whose threats or acts of terrorism conceivably may require a nu-
clear deterrent or response.
General Assembly, supra note 16, at 836.
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tion decreases the support for the ICJ. Military technology is constantly
changing. 28 5 The principle of sovereignty constantly changes. 28 6 Global
threats grow and the world recognizes the increasing need to act as a
community. The ICJ should accept this change, and infact advocate
change to improve the global community and environment. "In a world
whose only constant is change and a perpetual realignment of forces
based on response to change, failure to accept the view that nation-
states are not like pieces on a chessboard 'with specified roles, set objec-
tives and fixed configurations' seems imprudent."28 7 Although acknowl-
edging the international standard to take measures toward the ulti-
mate extinction of the nuclear weapon, the ICJ failed to take the
strongest step of all, declaring the weapons illegal.
285. NACHT, supra note 68, at 57.
286. It is interesting to note, as Judge Weermantry did in his dissent that the United
Nations Charter was written before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The concepts
articulated in the Charter considered the scourges of war, but not to the extent of the nu-
clear weapon. This may have a bearing on the interpretation of the nonintervention and
sovereignty principles.
287. Jim Anthony, Introduction, in THE PACIFIC: PEACE, SECURITY AND THE NUCLEAR
ISSUE xvii (Ranginui Walker & William Sutherland eds., 1988).
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